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Abstract:	One	of	the	most	important	determinants	of	the	European	Union’s	role	in	international	affairs	is	
the	community’	own	definition	of	the	border	between	states	eligible	for	membership	and	states	that	are	
not	eligible.	Contrary	to	what	one	hears	in	official	pronouncements,	this	definition	has	been	repeatedly	
contested	and	changed	significantly	since	the	founding	of	the	community.	Prior	research	(Thomas	2017)	
has	established	that	contestation	from	domestic	and	supranational	forces	within	the	community	has	
changed	the	normative	definition	of	the	limits	of	Europe	three	times	since	the	1950s.	This	paper	introduces	
a	new	database	of	all	fifty	EU	decisions	on	membership	eligibility	of	aspirant	states	from	1957	through	
2017,	some	positive,	some	negative,	and	some	reversing	an	earlier	decision.	It	then	uses	three	analytical	
techniques	–	cross-tabulation,	regression,	and	qualitative	comparative	analysis	(QCA)	--	to	evaluate	the	
relative	contribution	of	these	changing	membership	norms,	as	compared	to	other	legal,	political	and	
economic	factors,	to	the	EU	decision-making	in	these	fifty	cases.	All	three	methods	indicate	that	
membership	norms	exert	a	powerful	effect	on	EU	decisions	that	cannot	be	attributed	to	other	factors.		
	
	
	 	
	
One	of	the	causes	of	the	trial	and	error	and	reversals	of	the	European	idea	[has	been]	the	changing	conceptions,	
according	to	political	currents,	of	the	appropriate	geographical	area	of	a	united	Europe.		
--	Pierre	Werner,	Prime	Minister	of	Luxembourg,	19661	
	
	
I. Introduction	
	
Is	EU	decision-making	on	the	membership	eligibility	of	applicant	states	shaped	by	the	fit	between	the	
membership	norm	prevailing	within	the	community	and	the	character	of	the	applicant	state,	or	do	other	factors	
appear	to	have	a	stronger	effect	on	EU	decisions?	This	chapter	offers	various	empirical	tests	of	competing	arguments	
regarding	the	factors	that	shape	a	regional	community’s	decision-making	on	the	membership	eligibility	of	non-
member	states.	As	discussed	in	the	first	two	chapters,	the	relative	explanatory	strength	of	these	arguments	should	
be	evident	in	the	pattern	of	the	community’s	decisions	(i.e.,	which	states	are	deemed	eligible	and	which	are	not,	
over	time)	and	in	the	decision-making	process	(which	arguments	and	which	conditions	shaped	particular	decisions).	
The	second	measure,	requiring	detailed	evidence	of	the	EU’s	decision-making	process,	is	the	focus	of	later	chapters.	
This	chapter	assesses	the	first	measure	by	testing	the	fit	between	the	six	theories’	expectations	regarding	EU	
decisions	on	membership	eligibility	and	outcomes	in	each	of	the	50	cases	where	the	EU	(including	its	predecessors,	
the	EEC	and	the	EC)	made	such	as	decision	between	1957	and	2017.	Part	II	presents	the	parameters	of	the	dataset	of	
EU	decisions,	including	criteria	for	case	selection,	sources	and	coding,	and	introduces	the	three	analytical	methods	–	
cross	tabulation,	logistic	regression	analysis,	and	qualitative	comparative	analysis	--	used	to	assess	the	explanatory	
power	of	the	various	theoretical	approaches.	Part	III	examines	each	theoretical	argument	in	turn,	including	a	brief	
summary	of	its	logic,	an	explanation	of	how	its	key	concept(s)	are	converted	into	measurable	variables,	and	the	
cross-tabulation	results	showing	the	proportion	of	cases	whose	outcomes	fit	the	theory’s	expectations.	Part	IV	
discusses	the	significance	and	limitations	of	the	cross-tabulation	analysis.	Part	V	lays	out	the	design	and	results	of	
two	robustness	checks	on	the	preceding	findings	–	one	using	logistic	regression	analysis	and	the	second	using	
qualitative	comparative	analysis.	Finally,	Part	VI	summarises	the	results	and	transitions	to	the	chapters	that	follow.	
	
II. Data	and	Methods	
	
Working	with	a	variety	of	primary	and	secondary	sources,	we	have	identified	50	cases	during	the	period	
1957-2017	in	which	the	EU	took	a	position	on	the	membership	eligibility	of	a	non-member	state,	including	39	cases	
where	the	state	was	deemed	eligible	for	membership	and	11	cases	where	it	was	deemed	ineligible.	Notwithstanding	
the	nuances	of	each	decision,	these	outcomes	are	reduced	to	a	binary	variable	(eligible-ineligible)	in	order	to	
facilitate	comparison	of	the	various	arguments.	A	few	cases	where	the	EU	took	an	ambiguous	position	are	coded	as	
ineligible.	Some	but	not	all	of	the	states	deemed	eligible	have	now	completed	the	accession	process	and	joined	the	
Union.		
All	50	cases	are	summarised	below	in	Table	1	and	presented	more	fully	in	the	book’s	Appendix.	Most	states	
on	the	list	only	appear	once	but	some	appear	several	times,	either	because	they	were	declared	ineligible	and	later	
re-applied	or	because	they	were	declared	eligible	but	subsequent	events	led	the	EU	to	revisit	its	position.	It	is	
therefore	possible	to	assess	whether	variation	in	the	indicators	associated	with	the	six	explanations	fit	the	observed	
pattern	of	decision-making	on	membership	eligibility.		
	
	
	
	 	
																																																								
1	Pierre	Werner	(1966).	Aspects	de	l'évolution	récente	de	la	construction	européenne.	Exposé	devant	l'American	Common	Market	
Club.	Bruxelles,	5	juin	1966,	at:	http://aei.pitt.edu/13675/.	Translation	by	DT.	
Table	1:	EU	positions	on	the	membership	eligibility	of	aspirant	states		
	
	
Some	of	the	50	cases	are	well	known	to	scholars	and	EU	observers,	while	others	are	virtually	unknown	
despite	their	contribution	to	the	course	of	European	integration.	This	mapping	of	EU	decision-making	differs	
considerably	from	conventional	accounts	of	EU	enlargement,	which	typically	present	cases	in	terms	of	regional	
‘waves’	of	accession:	the	northern	enlargement	in	the	1970s	(Denmark,	Ireland,	UK),	the	southern	enlargement	in	
Aspirant	state	 Year	 Eligibility:	1=yes,	2=no	
	
Greece		 1959	 1	
Turkey		 1959	 1	
Spain		 1960	 1	
United	Kingdom		 1961	 1	
Denmark		 1961	 1	
Norway		 1962	 1	
Spain		 1962	 2	
Ireland		 1962	 1	
United	Kingdom		 1963	 2	
Greece		 1967	 2	
United	Kingdom	 1967	 2	
United	Kingdom		 1970	 1	
Greece		 1976	 1	
Spain		 1977	 1	
Portugal		 1978	 1	
Morocco		 1987	 2	
Turkey		 1989	 2	
Czechoslovakia	 1990	 1	
Poland	 1990	 1	
Hungary	 1990	 1	
Bulgaria	 1991	 1	
Austria		 1992	 1	
Finland	 1992	 1	
Sweden	 1992	 1	
Romania	 1992	 1	
Slovak	Republic		 1993	 1	
Czech	Republic		 1993	 1	
Cyprus		 1993	 1	
Estonia		 1994	 1	
Latvia		 1994	 1	
Lithuania		 1994	 1	
Slovenia	 1995	 1	
Malta		 1995	 1	
Slovak	Republic	 1997	 2	
Slovak	Republic	 1999	 1	
Turkey		 1999	 1	
FYR	Macedonia	 2000	 1	
Croatia		 2000	 1	
Albania		 2003	 1	
Serbia	&	Montenegro	 2005	 1	
Bosnia-Herzegovina	 2005	 1	
Ukraine	 2005	 2	
Serbia	&	Montenegro	 2006	 2	
Montenegro	 2006	 1	
Serbia	 2007	 1	
Turkey	 2007	 2	
Iceland		 2010	 1	
Ukraine		 2011	 2	
Kosovo		 2013	 1	
Turkey	 2013	 1	
the	1980s	(Greece,	Portugal	and	Spain),	the	neutrals	enlargement	in	the	1990s	(Austria,	Finland,	Sweden),	the	
eastern	enlargement	in	the	early-mid	2000s	(former	Communist	states	plus	Cyprus	and	Malta),	followed	by	Croatia	
in	2013.	Notwithstanding	their	significance	in	other	regards,	these	waves	reflect	when	accession	treaties	were	
concluded	and	thus	tell	us	little	about	decision-making	on	the	membership	eligibility	of	particular	applicants.		
Several	situations	where	the	government	of	a	non-member	state	declared	its	interest	in	accession	are	also	
not	included	in	the	dataset,	either	because	the	government	soon	reversed	its	position	(Switzerland	1992)	or	the	
community’s	member	states	were	distracted	by	unrelated	events	from	making	a	collective	decision	on	eligibility	and	
the	government	subsequently	clarified	that	it	was	only	seeking	to	develop	commercial	ties	(Portugal	1962/1969).	
The	most	ambiguous	of	the	cases	not	included	in	the	dataset	is	that	of	Cape	Verde,	whose	Prime	Minister	José	Maria	
Neves	spoke	openly	starting	in	early	2005	about	his	interest	in	pursuing	EU	membership	for	his	country.2	During	a	
visit	to	Lisbon	in	May	of	that	year,	he	declared	his	plan	to	“go	as	far	as	possible”	in	cooperation	with	the	EU	and	
indicated	that	he	would	not	be	satisfied	with	“associate	status.”	The	following	month,	Cape	Verde’s	parliament	
debated	the	possibility	of	EU	membership.3	On	the	other	hand,	according	to	two	leading	Portuguese	media	sources,	
Cape	Verde	was	only	seeking	“a	special	status	from	the	European	Union”	and		“the	hypothesis	of	membership	was	
never	officially	assumed	by	the	Portuguese	and	Cape	Verdean	governments,	who	always	favored	the	more	
consensual	option	of	a	special	strategic	partnership.”4	Consistent	with	these	interpretations,	Cape	Verde	inquired	in	
late	2005	about	possible	participation	in	the	European	Neighborhood	Policy	(ENP).	Despite	a	supportive	resolution	
by	the	European	Parliament	in	January	2006,	which	recognised	Cape	Verde’s	“geographical	proximity,	cultural	and	
historical	affinity”	to	Europe,	the	country’s	inclusion	in	ENP	was	later	denied	by	the	EU	on	geographic	grounds.5	One	
could	imagine,	given	Neves’	previous	rhetoric,	that	the	EU	may	have	viewed	the	ENP	application	as	a	first	step	
toward	accession,	in	which	case	the	community’s	negative	reply	would	be	de	facto	a	negative	decision	on	
membership	eligibility.	However,	there	is	no	evidence	in	Council	or	Coreper	records	that	consideration	of	Cape	
Verde’s	ENP	application	was	in	any	way	linked	to	the	possibility	of	accession,	so	the	2006	decision	is	not	included	in	
the	dataset.6		
It	is	also	important	to	note	that	Table	1	does	not	include	situations	where	the	EU	has	quietly	sustained	(i.e.,	
not	reversed)	its	earlier	acceptance	or	rejection	of	an	applicant	state’s	eligibility.	For	example,	after	the	EEC	
accepted	Turkey’s	eligibility	in	1959,	it	could	have	but	did	not	reverse	that	decision	after	the	military	takeover	and	
political	repression	in	Ankara	the	following	year.	More	recently,	after	the	EU	rebuffed	Ukraine’s	pursuit	of	a	
membership	perspective	in	2011,	it	could	have	but	did	not	reverse	that	decision	following	the	‘Euromaidan’	revolt	of	
2013-14.	Such	non-events	(like	Sherlock	Holmes’	famous	dog	that	didn’t	bark)	are	notoriously	difficult	to	pin	down,	
but	they	can	play	an	important	role	in	counter-factual	hypothesis	testing	when	viewed	in	light	of	theories	that	
suggest	a	different	outcome	(Fearon	1991).	So	while	they	do	not	appear	in	Table	1,	some	situations	of	this	sort	are	
clearly	relevant	to	testing	competing	explanations	of	how	the	EU	decides	on	membership	eligibility	and	are	
referenced	as	such	in	the	empirical	analysis.	
Data	on	the	outcome	in	each	case	comes	from	a	variety	of	official	EU	documents	and	pronouncements,	
supplemented	by	contemporary	media	accounts,	scholarly	sources	and	interviews.	Variations	over	time	in	the	
membership	norms	themselves	are	drawn	from	Thomas	(2017).	Data	on	each	aspirant	state’s	status	with	regard	to	
the	various	explanatory	variables	are	explained	below	in	part	V.	
To	test	the	explanatory	power	of	the	various	theoretical	arguments,	we	analyse	the	dataset	using	three	
distinct	empirical	methodologies:	cross	tabulation,	logistic	regression,	and	crisp	set	qualitative	comparative	analysis	
(csQCA).	First,	we	evaluate	each	case	to	determine	whether	the	outcome	fits	the	expectations	derived	from	the																																																									
2	Alena	Vysotskaya	Guedes	Vieira	and	Laura	C.	Ferreira-Pereira	(2009).	The	European	Union-Cape	Verde	Special	Relationship:	
The	Role	of	Portugal.	Portuguese	Journal	of	International	Affairs	No.1,	Spring,	pp.42-50	
3	Cabo	Verde	poderá	apresentar	proposta	de	adesão	à	UE	ainda	este	ano	–	PM,	www.rtp.pt,	6	May	2005;	Cabo	Verde	vai	pedir	
adesão	à	UE,	www.cmjournal.pt,	7	May	2005;	Parlamento	de	Cabo	Verde	debatirá	“adhesión”	a	la	Unión	Europea,	Afrol	News,	
10	June	2005.	
4	Cabo	Verde	poderá	apresentar	proposta	de	adesão	à	UE	ainda	este	ano	–	PM,	www.rtp.pt,	6	May	2005;	Cabo	Verde	ganha	
estatuto	especial	com	União	Europeia.	Publico.pt,	26	October	2007.		
5	Authors’	email	correspondence	with	EU	Council	officials,	July	2017.	
6	Authors’	email	correspondence	with	EU	Council	officials,	July	2017.	
various	hypotheses	in	light	of	the	relevant	values	on	their	respective	explanatory	variables.	Then,	for	each	argument,	
the	correlations	between	explanatory	variable	and	outcomes	are	presented	in	cross-tab	or	contingency	table	format.	
Although	correlation	is	not	equivalent	to	causation,	a	strong	correlation	between	variables	with	a	plausible	
relationship	in	theory	would	indicate	the	possible	presence	of	a	causal	or	constitutive	relationship	that	merits	
further	investigation,	while	a	low	correlation	indicates	that	a	significant	relationship	between	the	variables	is	
unlikely.	A	strong	correlation	is	thus	necessary	but	not	sufficient	evidence	of	a	causal	or	constitutive	relationship	and	
a	valuable	step	toward	explaining	EU	decisions	over	time	in	this	important	and	under-studied	area.	Comparing	the	
empirical	fit	of	the	five	arguments	thus	provides	an	initial	assessment	of	their	relative	explanatory	power.		
We	then	ran	two	types	of	robustness	check	on	this	initial	finding	–	one	using	logistic	regression	and	one	
using	csQCA.	These	three	methods	rely	on	different	logics	of	causation,	but	we	have	chosen	to	use	them	together	to	
increase	our	confidence	that	whatever	pattern,	if	any,	we	observe	in	the	data	is	indeed	indicative	of	a	causal	
relationship.	And	if	we	observe	no	pattern	in	the	data,	the	triple	methodology	will	increase	our	confidence	that	we	
have	not	overlooked	something	important.	Cross-tabulations	and	logistic	regression	define	causation	in	terms	of	the	
degree	of	correlation	between	explanatory	variables	and	the	outcome	variables;	they	are	typically	used	to	assess	the	
relative	power	of	competing	explanations.	In	contrast,	csQCA	relies	on	a	conjunctural	logic	better	suited	to	capturing	
independent	multivariate	causal	pathways	to	the	same	outcome.	The	point	here	is	not	to	debate	ontological	or	
epistemological	claims	regarding	causation	but	to	increase	our	confidence	in	the	project’s	empirical	findings	by	
subjecting	the	data	to	multiple	analytical	methods.	
	
III. Theoretical	Expectations		
	
As	previewed	in	chapter	1	and	elaborated	in	chapter	2,	there	are	at	least	six	distinctive	explanations	for	variation	in	
EU	decision-making	on	membership	eligibiity:	membership	norms,	geography,	treaty	rules,	regime	type,	commercial	
interests,	and	geopolitical	interests.	We	compare	these	arguments’	explanatory	fit	to	that	of	a	baseline	assumption	
that	all	states	seeking	to	join	the	community	will	be	welcomed	and	thus	considered	eligible	for	membership.	
	
Baseline:	Open	door	
	
For	analytical	purposes,	the	baseline	expectation	is	that	the	EU	will	not	distinguish	between	states	seeking	to	join	
the	community:	instead,	it	will	grant	membership	eligibility	to	all	aspirant	states.	This	expectation	is	consistent	with	
at	least	two	theoretical	logics.	The	first,	based	on	neoclassical	economics’	theory	of	gains-from-trade,	indicates	that	
expanded	markets	yield	greater	welfare	for	all	and	therefore	that	states	should	seek	to	eliminate	tariffs	and	
regulatory	barriers	between	them.	Welcoming	additional	states	into	an	existing	‘common	market’	or	‘single	market’	
would	accomplish	this	goal	more	efficiently	than	negotiating	bilateral	reductions	in	trade	barriers,	so	all	aspirant	
states	should	be	considered	eligible	for	membership.	The	second	possible	explanation	for	the	baseline	expectation,	
based	on	realist	balance-of-power	theory,	is	that	the	members	of	a	regional	community	may	view	it	as	a	collective	
response	to	their	individual	vulnerability	in	a	world	of	more	powerful	states	or	coalitions,	so	all	aspirant	states	would	
be	welcomed	as	means	to	improve	the	community’s	relative	power	position.	
	
Membership	norms	
	
The	principal	argument	proposed	and	tested	in	this	book	is	that	EU	decisions	on	the	membership	eligibility	of	states	
seeking	accession	are	shaped	by	the	outsider’s	conformity	with	membership	norms	prevailing	within	the	Union	–	
namely,	among	member	states’	governments	and	senior	supranational	officials.	In	empirical	terms,	the	expectation	
is	that	non-member	states	seeking	accession	that	fit	the	norm	will	be	recognised	as	eligible	for	membership,	while	
those	that	do	not	fit	the	norm	will	be	considered	ineligible.	Furthermore,	applicant	states	that	are	considered	eligible	
for	membership	in	one	period	may	be	judged	ineligible	in	a	later	period,	or	vice	versa,	depending	on	changes	in	the	
fit	between	prevailing	membership	norms	and	the	characteristics	of	the	applicant	state.	
	
Geography	
	
Geographic	explanations	of	membership	eligibility	suggest	that	if	a	regional	community	aims	to	integrate	or	govern	a	
particular	geographic	space,	then	any	state	located	fully	or	even	partly	within	this	space	would	be	considered	eligible	
for	membership,	and	states	located	elsewhere	would	be	ineligible.	Two	slightly	different	relationships	are	suggested	
by	this	logic	–	one	focused	on	an	applicant	state’s	location	with	a	certain	limited	area	and	the	other	on	closeness	to	
others.	To	test	this	argument,	we	consider	here	three	distinct	propositions,	focused	respectively	on	conventional	
geography,	institutionally	recognized	geography,	and	geographic	proximity.	
	
Treaty	rules	
	
The	argument	that	rules	in	a	regional	community’s	governing	treaty	determine	its	decisions-making	on	applicant	
states	is	consistent	with	two	possible	causal	mechanisms:		either	the	governments	of	member	states	are	persuaded	
by	the	prescriptive	content	of	the	treaty	rule	or	they	value	the	credibility	of	the	community	as	a	whole	and	the	
integrity	of	its	decision-making	process	above	their	own	preferences	regarding	particular	membership	applicants	and	
above	whatever	norms	may	prevail	within	the	community.		In	either	case,	this	argument	yields	the	following	testable	
expectation	(hyp.4):	a	regional	community	will	recognize	the	membership	eligibility	of	non-member	states	that	fit	the	
substantive	rule	on	memberships	established	by	the	community’s	treaty,	and	reject	others.		
	
Regime	type	
	
States	vary	widely	in	their	domestic	structures	and	governance	norms	and	this	variation	may	determine	whether	or	
not	a	regional	community	considers	them	eligible	for	membership.	In	particular,	we	hypothesize	that	a	regional	
community	will	accord	membership	eligibility	to	aspirant	states	whose	regime	types	are	similar	to	that	of	member	
states	and	treat	others	as	ineligible.	In	the	EU	content,	both	during	and	after	the	Cold	War,	such	variation	has	most	
often	been	conceived	in	terms	of	a	state’s	degree	of	liberal	democracy.	
	
Commercial	interests	
	
In	addition	to	the	baseline	expectation	introduced	above,	there	are	two	distinct	ways	that	a	regional	community’s	
decisions	on	membership	eligibility	may	be	shaped	by	the	commercial	interests	of	its	member	states.	Although	their	
empirical	expectations	are	mirror	opposites	of	each	other,	their	distinctive	logics	merit	separate	presentations.	
One	possibility	(hypothesis	5a)	is	that	the	economic	opportunities	created	by	integrating	new	states	with	strong	
regulatory	capacities	into	a	common	market	area	would	motivate	the	community	to	accord	membership	eligibility	to	
all	aspirants	whose	regulatory	capacity	is	similar	or	superior	to	that	of	the	current	member	states.		Another	
possibility	(hypothesis	5b)	posits	the	opposite	relationship	between	GDP	and	membership	eligibility	–	namely,	that	
the	members	of	a	regional	community	will	see	states	with	lower	levels	of	economic	development	as	attractive	
markets	for	their	goods	and	investment	capital	and	thus	welcome	their	eventual	integration	into	the	community’s	
common	market	area	while	rejecting	wealthier	states	whose	own	exports	could	threaten	domestic	producers	and	
workers.	
	
Geopolitics	
	
In	contrast	to	the	geographical	explanations	explored	above,	which	focus	on	the	physical	location	of	an	applicant	
state,	geopolitics	explanations	focus	on	the	likely	implications	of	enlargement	for	the	geopolitical	security	of	the	
community.	Put	simply,	they	suggest	that	a	regional	community	will	welcome	a	non-member	state	whose	accession	
would	reduce	member	states’	exposure	to	geopolitical	threats	or	improve	their	capability	for	resisting	geopolitical	
threats,	and	reject	those	whose	accession	would	have	the	opposite	effect.	There	are	at	least	two	ways	to	
conceptualize	how	the	members	of	a	regional	community	understand	the	link	between	enlargement	and	security	–	
one	focused	on	the	risk	of	conflict	and	the	other	on	alliance	credibility	
	
IV. Cross-tabulation	Results	
	
Baseline:	Open	door	
	
Looking	at	the	50	cases	in	the	historical	record,	we	see	that	this	expectation	of	an	unconditional	granting	of	
membership	eligibility	status	is	not	met.	Of	the	50	decisions,	only	39	were	positive.	This	indicates	either	that	EC/EU	
member	states	do	not	consistently	equate	the	possibility	of	enlargement	with	economic	or	geopolitical	gain,	or	
these	prospects	do	not	consistently	override	other	objections.	Overall,	the	baseline	expectation’s	78%	predictive	
accuracy	is	relatively	high	but	not	high	enough	to	justify	an	a	priori	dismissal	of	alternative	explanations.	
	
Membership	norms	
	
The	explanatory	variable	here	is	the	fit	between	the	prevailing	EU	membership	norm	and	the	character	of	the	state	
seeking	membership	in	the	year	that	the	latter	expresses	its	interest	in	accession.	As	discussed	in	the	previous	
chapter,	the	EU’s	membership	norms	have	evolved	through	four	identifiable	normative	periods.	During	the	first	
three	periods,	the	norms	applicable	to	membership	eligibility	indicated	that	states	holding	or	seeking	membership	
should	be	a	non-communist	European	state	(1957-1961),	a	European	parliamentary	democracy	(1962-1969),	and	a	
European	liberal	democracy	(1970-2005).	The	liberal	democracy	norm	broke	down	in	late	2005	but	the	governments	
of	the	member	states	have	not	converged	on	an	alternative	definition	of	membership	eligibility,	so	the	norms	
hypothesis	becomes	indeterminate	at	that	point.	As	a	result,	this	hypothesis	can	only	be	tested	with	42	of	the	50	
cases;	eight	post-2005	cases	are	excluded.	
In	order	to	assess	various	states’	conformity	with	the	non-Communist	norm	during	the	first	period,	we	relied	
on	membership	in	the	leading	military	and	economic	organizations	of	the	Soviet	bloc:	the	Warsaw	Pact	and	the	
Council	on	Mutual	Economic	Assistance.	Both	organizations	had	identical	memberships	in	this	period:	Albania,	
Bulgaria,	Czechoslovakia,	the	German	Democratic	Republic,	Hungary,	Poland,	Romania	and	the	Soviet	Union.		To	this	
list,	we	added	Yugoslavia,	which	was	non-aligned	but	explicitly	socialist	in	ideology.	Given	the	non-Communist	norm	
prevailing	in	1957-1961,	we	would	expect	any	of	these	states	would	be	considered	ineligible	for	membership	in	the	
European	Community,	while	any	other	European	state	would	be	considered	eligible.		
In	order	to	assess	a	country’s	status	as	a	parliamentary	democracy	(the	second	normative	period)	or	liberal	
democracy	(the	third	period),	we	rely	on	the	categories	and	data	provided	by	Freedom	House	(FH).	The	FH	dataset	
includes	a	clearly	defined	‘electoral	democracy’	category	that	corresponds	closely	to	the	‘parliamentary	democracy’	
norm	and	a	more	stringent	‘Free’	category	limited	to	states	that	“can	be	considered	both	electoral	and	liberal	
democracies,”	meaning	that	they	also	ensure	respect	for	civil	liberties,	including	freedoms	of	expression	and	belief,	
associational	and	organizational	rights,	rule	of	law,	and	personal	autonomy	(Freedom	House	2014).	These	are	
preferable	for	two	reasons	to	leading	alternative	indexes.		The	Varieties	of	Democracy	dataset	(V-Dem)	places	states	
on	various	1-10	scales	without	over-arching	categories	(Lindberg	et	al.	2014)	while	Polity	IV	uses	a	20-point	scale	
divided	into	three	categories	(autocracy	-10	to	-6,	anocracy	-5	to	+5,	and	democracy	+6	to	+10)	that	obscure	the	
distinction	between	parliamentary	and	liberal	democracies	
However,	in	order	to	measure	a	non-member	state’s	conformity	with	the	‘parliamentary	democracy’	norm	
using	FH’s	‘electoral	democracy’	category	or	its	conformity	with	the	‘liberal	democracy’	norm	using	FH’s	‘Free’	
category,	we	had	to	overcome	the	FH	dataset’s	limited	temporal	coverage,	which	extends	back	only	to	1989	for	the	
electoral	democracy	indicator	and	to	1972	for	the	Free/Not	Free	distinction.	As	a	result	of	this	limited	range,	none	of	
the	cases	of	countries	wanting	to	start	membership	negotiations	during	the	period	of	the	‘parliamentary	democracy’	
norm	are	covered	by	FH’s	electoral	democracy	indicator,	while	one	case	(the	UK	in	1970)	covered	by	the	‘liberal	
democracy’	norm	precedes	FH’s	Free/Not	Free	categorization.	To	solve	this	problem,	we	use	V-Dem	data	that	covers	
the	full	post-1945	period	to	impute	missing	country	scores	on	the	FH	variables.	For	discussion	of	this	technique,	see	
the	Appendix.	
As	shown	in	the	table	below,	of	the	42	cases	of	EC/EU	decision-making	on	the	membership	eligibility	of	a	
non-member	state	that	occurred	while	the	EU	had	determinate	membership	norms,	33	or	78%	of	the	cases	resulted	
in	decisions	that	fit	the	prevailing	norm,	including	cases	of	eligibility	when	the	non-member	state	fit	the	norm	and	
cases	of	ineligibility	when	it	did	not	fit	the	norm;	only	9	cases	or	21%	fell	outside	the	hypothesized	pattern.	The	
membership	norms	argument	does	not	predict	a	particular	outcome	for	the	8	cases	that	occurred	when	the	EC/EU	
lacked	a	determinate	norm;	instead,	it	simply	expects	that	such	decisions	will	be	shaped	by	hard,	interest-based	
bargaining	rather	than	by	normative	constraints.	
	
Hyp.	1:	Membership	norms	–	33/42	or	78%	fit	
	
	
This	evidence	of	a	strong	relationship	between	the	content	of	EU	membership	norms	and	the	outcome	of	EU	
decisions	on	membership	eligibility	suggests	that	the	former	may	play	an	important	role	in	regional	community	
decision-making.	However,	we	cannot	really	assess	its	significance	before	comparing	it	to	evidence	of	how	other	
possible	explanatory	variables	relate	to	the	same	outcomes.	
	
Geography	
	
The	first	of	these	(hypothesis	2a)	focuses	on	a	conventional	geographic	definition	of	Europe:	The	European	
Community/European	Union	will	accord	membership	eligibility	to	non-member	states	whose	territory	is	located	
physically	within	the	geographic	space	conventionally	identified	as	Europe,	and	reject	others.	To	test	this	expectation	
we	first	use	Encyclopædia	Britannica’s	definition	of	the	European	continent:	“Geographically,	Europe	is	the	Western	
peninsula	of	Eurasia,	conventionally	delimited	by	the	Mediterranean	Sea,	the	Black	Sea,	and	the	Caucasus	Mountains	
in	the	South,	the	Atlantic	Ocean	in	the	West,	the	Arctic	Ocean	in	the	North,	and	the	Urals	and	the	Caspian	Sea	in	the	
East”	(cited	in	Schimmelfennig	2016:	178-9).		By	this	definition,	small	parts	of	Kazakhstan	and	Turkey	and	a	large	part	
of	Russia	lie	within	the	furthest	eastern	and	southeastern	reaches	of	Europe,	but	most	of	Turkey,	all	of	Cyprus	and	
North	Africa	lie	beyond	Europe.		
	 This	test	suggests	a	strong	relationship	between	conventional	understandings	of	Europe	and	EU	decisions	on	
membership	eligibility.	If	we	assume	that	the	approximately	5%	of	Turkish	territory	that	lies	north	of	the	Bosporus	
qualifies	the	entire	country	as	lying	within	the	conventional	geographic	limits	of	Europe,	then	thirty-eight	of	fifty	
cases	lie	within	conventional	Europe	and	were	judged	eligible	for	EU	membership	while	one	case	lies	outside	the	
Europe	and	was	considered	ineligible,	meaning	that	thirty-nine	of	fifty	or	78%	of	the	cases	fit	the	hypothesis.	On	the	
other	hand,	ten	of	fifty	lie	within	conventional	Europe	but	were	judged	ineligible	while	one	lies	outside	conventional	
Europe	but	was	considered	eligible	for	membership,	meaning	that	22%	defy	the	hypothesis.		
	
Hyp.	2a,	test	1:	Encyclopædia	Britannica’s	‘Europe’	–	39/50	or	78%	fit	
	 	
Within	‘Europe’	
	
	
Beyond	‘Europe’	
	
	
Eligible	
	
	
38/50	=	76%	
	
1/50	=	2%	
	
	
Not	eligible	
	
	
10/50	=	20%	
	
	
1/50	=	2%	
	
	
	 	
Fits	membership	norm		
	
	
Does	not	fit	membership	norm		
	
Eligible	
	
28/42	=	67%	
	
1/42	=	2%	
	
	
Not	eligible	
	
	
8/42	=	19%	
	
	
5/42	=	11%	
	
It	is	also	possible	to	test	this	hypothesis	using	a	definition	of	Europe’s	geographic	limits		accepted	by	another	
authoritative	international	institution.	To	this	end,	we	considered	two	different	regional	classifications	used	by	the	
United	Nations.	One,	the	U.N.	General	Assembly’s	regional	voting	bloc	‘West	European	and	Others	Group’,	is	too	
clearly	political	to	be	useful	here:	Australia,	Canada,	Israel	and	New	Zealand	are	permanent	members	and	the	United	
States	has	Observer	status.	Instead,	we	used	the	regional	codes	developed	“for	statistical	processing	purposes”	by	
the	United	Nations’	Statistics	Division,	whose	‘Europe’	category	includes	53	countries	and	areas	including	micro-
states	like	Andorra	and	Monaco	and	autonomous	sub-state	units	like	the	Åland	Islands	and	Gibraltar.7	
	 When	tested	against	the	fifty	cases	of	EU	membership	(in)eligibility,	this	test	supported	the	conventional	
geography	hypothesis	about	as	strongly	as	the	Encyclopædia	Britannica	test:	thirty-five	of	fifty	cases	lie	within	this	
U.N.	definition	of	Europe	and	were	judged	eligible	for	EU	membership	while	three	cases	lie	outside	the	U.N.	
definition	and	were	considered	ineligible,	meaning	that	thirty-eight	of	fifty	or	76%	of	the	cases	fit	the	hypothesis.	On	
the	other	hand,	eight	of	fifty	lie	within	the	U.N.	definition	of	Europe	but	were	judged	ineligible	while	four	lies	outside	
the	U.N.’s	‘Europe’	but	were	considered	eligible	for	membership,	meaning	that	24%	defy	the	hypothesis.	
	
Hyp.	2a,	test	2:	The	U.N.’s	‘Europe’	–	38/50	or	76%	fit		
	 	
Within	‘Europe’	
	
	
Beyond	‘Europe’	
	
	
Eligible	
	
	
35/50	=	70%	
	
4/50	=	8%	
	
	
Not	eligible	
	
	
8/50	=	16%	
	
	
3/50	=	6%	
	
	
An	alternative	version	of	the	geographic	argument	focuses	not	on	an	a	priori	definition	of	the	region’s	limits	
but	on	the	non-member	state’s	geographic	proximity	to	the	community’s	current	external	frontier.	The	expectation	
(hypothesis	2b)	would	be	as	follows:	The	European	Union	will	accord	membership	eligibility	to	non-member	states	
whose	territory	is	contiguous	to	that	of	a	current	member	state,	and	reject	others.	To	test	this	expectation,	we	define	
‘contiguous’	to	mean	sharing	a	land	border	with	an	EU	member	state	or	separated	from	the	territory	of	a	member	
state	by	no	more	than	50	miles	(80	km)	of	sea.	Some	studies	of	membership	in	international	organizations	use	a	
higher	measure	of	separation	by	sea,	but	given	our	focus	on	a	regional	organization,	the	50-mile	measure	(also	used	
by	Mansfield	and	Pevehouse	2013)	seemed	most	appropriate.	By	this	logic,	geography	determines	the	zone	of	
potential	membership	eligibility	but	as	long	as	the	community’s	external	border	keeps	expanding,	there	is	no	
ultimate	frontier	of	eligibility.	
When	tested	against	the	fifty	cases	of	EU	membership	(in)eligibility,	this	hypothesis	proved	far	weaker	than	
the	preceding	conventional	geography	hypotheses:	twenty-two	of	fifty	cases	were	contiguous	to	a	member	state	
and	were	judged	eligible	for	EU	membership	while	four	cases	were	non-contiguous	and	were	considered	ineligible,	
meaning	that	only	twenty-six	or	52%	of	the	cases	fit	the	hypothesis.	On	the	other	hand,	eleven	of	fifty	were	
contiguous	but	not	accorded	eligibility	while	thirteen	were	accorded	eligibility	despite	being	non-contiguous,	
meaning	that	48%	defy	the	hypothesis.	
	
Hyp.	2b:	Geographic	contiguity	–	26/50	or	52%	fit	
	 	
Contiguous	
	
	
Not	contiguous	
	
Eligible	
	
	
22/50	=	44%	
	
13/50	=	26%	
	 	 																																																									
7	http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.htm	
Not	eligible	
	
11/50	=	22%	 4/50	=	8%	
	
	
Treaty	rules	
	
According	to	Article	237	of	the	1957	Treaty	of	Rome,	“Any	European	State	may	apply	to	become	a	member	of	the	
Community...	The	conditions	of	admission	and	the	adjustments	to	this	Treaty	necessitated	thereby	shall	be	the	
subject	of	an	agreement	between	the	Member	States	and	the	applicant	State.”	A	literal	reading	of	this	rule	indicates	
that	only	“European”	states	may	be	considered	for	membership	but	not	necessarily	that	all	“European”	states	would	
be	deemed	eligible.	However,	the	founding	member	states	could	have	included	a	more	stringent	definition	of	
eligibility	in	the	treaty,	and	the	treaty’s	travaux	préparatoires	reveal	that	this	option	was	indeed	considered	(see	
chapter	3).	It	is	therefore	reasonable	to	conclude	that	the	Treaty	of	Rome	deemed	all	“European”	states	minimally	
eligible	for	membership.	We	use	Encyclopædia	Britannica’s	version	of	the	conventional	geographic	definition	of	
‘Europe’	(see	above)	to	test	this	requirement,	which	remained	in	effect	for	decades.	
In	fact,	there	are	two	ways	to	interpret	when	the	EU	treaty	rules	on	membership	eligibility	changed,	so	we	
test	them	both.	By	one	reading,	the	1986	Single	European	Act	(SEA)	did	not	modify	the	Treaty	of	Rome’s	indication	
that	“All	European	states	may	apply…”	but	the	multiple	and	explicit	statements	of	the	community’s	commitment	to	
democracy,	fundamental	human	rights	and	the	rule	of	law	contained	in	its	Preamble	removed	any	doubt	that	these	
factors	had	become	treaty	requirements.	By	this	reading	(hypothesis	4,	test	1),	the	treaty	rule	hypothesis	would	
expect	the	community	to	accord	membership	eligibility	to	all	“European”	applicant	states	(measured	by	the	
Encyclopædia	Britannica	definition)	in	the	years	prior	to	1986,	and	only	to	European	liberal	democracies	(measured	
by	the	Freedom	House	‘free’	category)	in	the	years	since	1986.	This	test	yields	an	explanatory	fit	of	70%.	
	
Hyp.4,	test	1:	Treaty	rules	change	1986	–	35/50		or	70%	fit	
	 	
Fits	treaty	rules	
1957-1986,	1987-2015	
	
	
Does	not	fit	treaty	rules	
1957-1986,	1987-2015	
	
	
Eligible	
	
	
29/50	=	58%	
	
10/50	=	20%	
	
Not	eligible	
	
	
5/50	=	10%	
	
6/50	=	12%	
	
Alternatively,	a	reading	that	focuses	on	the	treaties’	articles	rather	than	their	preambular	text	would	
conclude	that	EU	treaty	rules	on	membership	eligibility	did	not	change	until	the	1992	(Maastricht)	Treaty	on	
European	Union,	which	retained	the	“All	European	states	may	apply”	formula	but	added	that	the	Member	States’	
governments	are	“founded	on	the	principles	of	democracy”	and	constitutionally	committed	to	respect	fundamental	
rights.	By	this	reading	(hypothesis	4,	test	2),	the	treaty	rule	hypothesis	would	expect	all	“European”	applicant	states	
(measured	by	the	Encyclopædia	Britannica	definition)	to	be	accorded	membership	eligibility	prior	to	1992,	and	only	
European	liberal	democracies	(measured	by	the	Freedom	House	‘free’	category)	in	the	years	since	1992.	This	test	
yields	an	explanatory	fit	of	68%,	just	two	points	below	the	first	test.	
	
Hyp.4,	test	2:	Treaty	rules	change	1992	–	34/50	or	68%	fit	
	 	
Fits	treaty	rules	
1957-1992,	1993-2015		
	
	
Does	not	fit	treaty	rules	
1957-1992,	1993-2015		
	
	
Eligible	
	
29/50	=	58%	
	
10/50	=	20%	
	
	
Not	eligible	
	
	
6/50	=	12%	
	
5/50	=	10%	
	
Regime	type	
	
States	vary	widely	in	their	domestic	structures	and	governance	norms	and	this	variation	may	determine	whether	or	
not	a	regional	community	considers	them	eligible	for	membership.	In	particular,	we	hypothesize	that	a	regional	
community	will	accord	membership	eligibility	to	aspirant	states	whose	regime	types	are	similar	to	that	of	member	
states	and	treat	others	as	ineligible.	In	the	EU	content,	both	during	and	after	the	Cold	War,	such	variation	has	most	
often	been	conceived	in	terms	of	a	state’s	degree	of	liberal	democracy.	To	test	this	hypothesis,	we	test	the	effect	of	
regime	similarity	in	two	ways:	first	we	test	whether	the	EU	only	accords	membership	eligibility	to	aspirant	states	
whose	liberal	democracy	score	is	equal	to	or	greater	than	that	of	the	lowest-scoring	member	state,	and	then	we	test	
whether	it	limits	eligibility	to	aspirant	states	whose	score	is	equal	to	or	greater	than	the	mean	score	of	all	member	
states.	For	both	tests,	we	use	the	V-Dem	scoring	of	liberal	democracy	since	1900,	which	includes	all	our	50	cases	
except	Slovakia	1993,	which	had	just	become	independent,	and	Malta	1995,	which	is	too	small.	As	shown	below,	the	
community-minimum	test	yields	an	explanatory	fit	of	60%	and	the	community-mean	test	yields	a	fit	of	just	44%.	
	
Hyp.4:	Regime	type,	test	1:	29/48	or	60%	fit	
	 	
	
V-Dem	Score	>=	EU	minimum	
	
	
	
V-Dem	Score	<	EU	minimum	
	
	
EU	position:	Eligible	
	
	
20/48	=	42%	
	
17/48	=	35%	
	
EU	position:	Not	eligible	
	
	
2/48	=	4%	
	
9/48	=	19%	
	
Hyp.4:	Regime	type,	test	2:	21/48	or	44%	fit	
	 	
V-Dem	Score	>=	mean	in	EU	
	
	
V-Dem	Score	<	mean	in	EU	
	
	
EU	position:	Eligible	
	
	
12/48	=	25%	
	
25/48	=	52%	
	
EU	position:	Not	eligible	
	
	
2/48	=	4%	
	
9/48	=	19%	
	
Regime	type	is	a	poor	predictor	of	membership	eligibility.	The	‘liberal	democracy’	score	of	aspirant	states,	
whether	tested	in	comparison	to	the	member	states	mean	or	to	the	lowest-scoring	member	state,	does	not	
correlate	consistently	with	EU	decisions.	In	short,	the	EU	has	not	required	that	aspirant	states	exhibit	a	level	of	
liberal	democracy	equal	or	greater	than	of	states	already	belonging	to	the	community.	It	is	also	interesting	to	note	
that	the	two	correlations	associated	with	this	variable	(44%	and	60%)	are	inconsistent	with	the	opposite	hypothesis,	
that	the	EU	prioritises	aspirant	states	with	a	poor	score	on	liberal	democracy.	This	does	not	mean	that	regime	type	is	
irrelevant	to	EU	decision-making	–	it	clearly	plays	a	role	in	the	membership	norms	and	treaty	rules	explanations	(see	
results	above	and	discussion	below)	–	but	as	a	stand-alone	variable,	it	is	remarkably	weak.	
	
Commercial	interests	
	
In	addition	to	the	baseline	expectation	introduced	above,	there	are	two	distinct	ways	that	a	regional	community’s	
decisions	on	membership	eligibility	may	be	shaped	by	the	commercial	interests	of	its	member	states.	Although	their	
empirical	expectations	are	mirror	opposites	of	each	other,	their	distinctive	logics	merit	separate	presentations.	
One	possibility	(hypothesis	5a)	is	that	the	economic	opportunities	created	by	integrating	new	states	with	
strong	regulatory	capacities	into	a	common	market	area	would	motivate	the	community	to	accord	membership	
eligibility	to	all	aspirants	whose	regulatory	capacity	is	similar	or	superior	to	that	of	the	current	member	states.		Given	
that	any	member	state	may	block	consensus	on	membership	eligibility,	testing	this	hypothesis	requires	evidence	of	
the	regulatory	capacity	of	each	aspirant	state	and	that	of	the	member	states	in	the	same	year.	Unfortunately,	the	
time	scopes	of	the	two	standard	sources	of	such	data	–	the	World	Bank’s	Governance	Indicators8	and	its	Doing	
Business	Data9	--	are	far	too	limited	in	historical	scope	to	be	useful	here:	the	first	begins	in	1996	and	the	second	in	
2003.	We	therefore	rely	on	GDP	per	capita	as	a	proxy	for	regulatory	capacity,	using	data	in	current	US$	available	
from	the	World	Bank	(2017)	and	OECD	(2017).10	The	hypothesis	thus	leads	us	to	expect	that	that	the	EU	will	accord	
membership	eligibility	to	aspirant	states	whose	GDP	per	capita	(proxy	for	regulatory	capacity)	is	equal	to	or	higher	
than	that	of	the	worst	performing	member	state,	and	deny	it	to	others.	
	
Hyp.5a:		Well-regulated	markets	–	20/50	or	40%	fit	
	 	
Equal	or	higher	GDP	per	capita	
	
	
Lower	GDP	per	capita	
	
EU	position:	Eligible	
	
	
12/50	=	24%	
	
27/50	=	54%	
	
EU	position:	Not	eligible	
	
	
	
3/50	=	6%	
	
8/50	=	16%	
	
Another	possibility	(hypothesis	5b)	posits	the	opposite	relationship	between	GDP	and	membership	eligibility	
–	namely,	that	the	members	of	a	regional	community	will	see	states	with	lower	levels	of	economic	development	as	
attractive	markets	for	their	goods	and	investment	capital	and	thus	welcome	their	eventual	integration	into	the	
community’s	common	market	area	while	rejecting	wealthier	states	whose	own	exports	could	threaten	domestic	
producers	and	workers.	This	hypothesis	leads	us	to	expect	that	that	the	EU	will	accord	membership	eligibility	to	
aspirant	states	whose	GDP	per	capita	is	lower	than	that	of	the	worst	performing	member	state,	and	deny	it	to	
others,	which	we	test	using	the	aforementioned	World	Bank	and	OECD	data.	
	
Hyp.5b:	Non-competitive	markets	–30/50	or	60%	fit	
	 	
Lower	GDP	per	capita	
	
	
Equal	or	higher	GDP	per	capita	
	
EU	position:	Eligible	
	
	
27/50	=	54%	
	
12/50	=	24%	
	
EU	position:	Not	eligible	
	
	
	
8/50	=	16%	
	
3/50	=	6%	
																																																									
8	http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/#home	
9	http://www.doingbusiness.org/data	
10	GDP	data	is	unavailable	for	Greece	1959	and	Turkey	1959	because	both	precede	World	Bank	and	OECD	coverage.	In	order	not	
to	lose	observations,	we	coded	both	countries	based	on	their	1960	scores.	Given	the	large	difference	in	terms	of	economic	
performance	between	the	two	cases	and	the	economically	weakest	EC	member	state	in	1960	(Italy),	we	are	confident	in	coding	
both	as	performing	inferior.	
Overall,	these	commercial	or	economic	explanations	are	strikingly	weak.	The	hypothesis	that	the	EU	will	
favor	more	prosperous	aspirants	because	their	well-regulated	markets	are	more	attractive	for	investment	correlates	
with	actual	EU	decisions	in	only	38%	of	the	cases.	The	alternative	hypothesis	that	the	community	will	favor	less	
prosperous	aspirants	because	they	offer	more	lucrative	investment	opportunities	and	less	risk	of	disruptive	
competition	fares	better	at	62%,	but	this	still	leaves	a	substantial	share	of	cases	unexplained.		In	sum,	commercial	
motives	do	not	appear	to	have	had	a	major	influence	on	EU	decision-making	on	the	membership	eligibility	of	
aspirant	states.		
	
Geopolitics	
	
In	contrast	to	the	geographical	explanations	explored	above,	which	focus	on	the	physical	location	of	an	applicant	
state,	geopolitics	explanations	focus	on	the	likely	implications	of	enlargement	for	the	geopolitical	security	of	the	
community.	Put	simply,	they	suggest	that	a	regional	community	will	welcome	a	non-member	state	whose	accession	
would	reduce	member	states’	exposure	to	geopolitical	threats	or	improve	their	capability	for	resisting	geopolitical	
threats,	and	reject	those	whose	accession	would	have	the	opposite	effect.	There	are	at	least	two	ways	to	
conceptualize	how	the	members	of	a	regional	community	understand	the	link	between	enlargement	and	security	–	
one	focused	on	the	risk	of	conflict	and	the	other	on	alliance	credibility	--	and	each	can	be	tested	empirically	in	
several	ways.	
	 In	the	risk-of-conflict	conceptualization,	decisions	on	membership	eligibility	are	based	upon	the	apparent	
probability	of	an	applicant	state’s	“involvement	in	an	international	militarized	conflict…	based	on	key	elements	of	
[its]	internal	characteristics	and	its	external	security	environment”	(Donno	et	al	2015:253,255).	By	this	logic	
(hypothesis	6a),	a	regional	community	will	accord	membership	eligibility	to	non-member	states	that	pose	a	low	risk	
of	involvement	in	inter-state	conflict,	and	deny	it	to	others.	To	test	this	possible	determinant,	we	rely	on	Nordhaus,	
Oneal	and	Russett’s	(2012)	global	ranking	of	states’	risk	of	involvement	in	international	conflict,	whose	time	
boundaries	exclude	13	of	the	50	cases	in	our	universe	of	EU	decisions	on	membership	eligibility.	We	subject	the	
remaining	37	cases	to	four	distinct	tests.	
Our	first	test	defines	‘low	risk’	as	states	falling	into	the	bottom	50%	of	the	global	ranking,	so	a	low-risk	state	
is	one	that	in	a	given	year	is	less	at	risk	than	the	median	country	of	that	year.	The	results	of	this	first	test	support	the	
hypothesis	in	49%	of	the	cases:	
	
Hyp.6a,	test	1:	Low	risk	states	(bottom	50%	of	global	ranking)	–	18/37	or	49%	fit	
	 	
Low	risk	
	
	
High	risk	
	
EU	position:	Eligible	
	
	
14/37	=	38%		
	
16/37	=	43%	
	
EU	position:	Not	eligible	
	
	
3/37	=	8%		
	
4/37	=	11%	
	
This	finding	could	give	rise	to	several	objections.	To	start,	being	among	the	fifty	percent	of	states	less	at	risk	
than	the	other	half	might	not	satisfy	the	security	demands	of	a	regional	community	such	as	the	EU.	In	other	words,	a	
country	just	slightly	less	risky	than	the	median	country	in	a	given	year	might	still	be	perceived	as	a	unacceptable	
security	risk,	so	the	community	might	be	more	demanding	on	conflict	risk	when	evaluating	the	membership	
eligibility	of	aspirant	states.	But	lowering	the	bar	to	cover	only	the	bottom	25%	of	states	has	the	unintended	effect	
of	excluding	every	aspirant	state	in	the	global	pool.	In	a	second	test	of	hypothesis	6a,	we	therefore	lower	the	bar	less	
dramatically,	defining	‘very	low	risk’	as	states	falling	into	the	bottom	25%	of	the	yearly	global	ranking,	which	lowers	
the	hypothesis’	empirical	fit	to	19%.		
	
Hyp.6a,	test	2:	Very	low	risk	states	(bottom	25%	of	global	ranking)	–	7/37	or	19%	fit	
	 	
Very	low	risk	
	
	
Higher	risk	
	
EU	position:	Eligible	
	
	
0/37	=	0%	
	
30/37	=	81%	
	
EU	position:	Not	eligible	
	
	
	
0/37	=	0%	
	
7/37	=	19%	
	
On	the	other	hand,	one	might	object	that	the	global	ranking	is	not	the	most	relevant	benchmark	for	regional	
communities	to	assess	potential	members’	risk	of	conflict.	Instead,	they	might	base	their	membership	eligibility	
decisions	on	a	comparison	to	other	states	in	their	geographic	region.	In	other	words,	when	compared	to	other	states	
in	one’s	own	geographic	region,	does	a	potential	member	pose	a	low	or	high	risk	of	conflict?	In	tests	3	and	4,	to	limit	
our	analysis	to	states	in	the	EU’s	region,	we	rely	on	the	aforementioned	UN	Statistics	Division’s	measure	of	Europe	
and	define	low	risk	and	very	low	risk	as	states	falling	into	the	bottom	50%	and	25%	of	the	regional	yearly	ranking.	
Neither	of	these	tests	indicates	a	strong	relationship	between	apparent	conflict	risk	and	membership	eligibility.	
	
Hyp.	6a,	test	3:	Low	risk	states	(bottom	50%	of	European	states)	–	17/37	or	46%	fit	
	 	
Low	risk	
	
	
High	risk	
	
EU	position:	Eligible	
	
	
12/37	=	32%	
	
18/37	=	49%	
	
EU	position:	Not	eligible	
	
	
	
2/37	=	5%	
	
5/37	=	14%	
	
Hyp.	6a,	test	4:	Very	Low	risk	states	(bottom	25%	of	European	states)	–	9/37	or	24%	
	 	
Very	low	risk	
	
	
Higher	risk	
	
EU	position:	Eligible	
	
	
2/37	=	5%	
	
28/37	=	76%	
	
EU	position:	Not	eligible	
	
	
	
0/37	=	0%	
	
7/37	=	19%	
	
	 A	second	version	of	the	geopolitics	explanation	posits	that	a	regional	community’s	decisions	on	an	applicant	
state’s	eligibility	for	membership	in	are	linked	to	the	members’	interest	in	reinforcing	the	credibility	of	a	security	
alliance	to	which	they	also	belong.	By	this	logic	(hypothesis	6b),	a	regional	community	will	accord	membership	
eligibility	to	aspirant	states	that	are	or	soon	will	be	members	of	the	security	alliance	to	which	most	of	the	
community’s	members	already	belong,	and	deny	it	to	others.	In	the	case	of	the	EU,	this	concerns	membership	in	
NATO,	the	security	alliance	to	which	most	members	of	the	community	also	belong.	
In	particular,	we	consider	the	impact	of	two	concentric	indicators	of	closeness	to	NATO:	states	that	are	full	
members	of	the	alliance,	and	states	with	a	clear	path	to	achieving	NATO	membership.	The	first	test	measures	the	fit	
between	NATO	membership	and	EU	membership	eligibility	at	the	time	of	the	latter’s	decision.	The	results	are	quite	
weak:	only	34%	of	the	cases	fit	the	expectation	that	NATO	members	would	be	granted	EU	membership	eligibility	
while	non-members	would	be	considered	ineligible.	
	
Hyp.6b,	test	1:	NATO	membership	–	17/50	or	34%	fit	
	
	
It	is	also	possible	that	the	EU	would	also	grant	eligibility	to	applicant	states	that	have	a	clear	prospect	of	NATO	
membership	in	addition	to	those	that	already	belong.	The	best	indicators	of	such	a	prospect	are	formal	recognition	
as	a	future	member	by	the	NATO	Council	or	after	April	1999	by	signature	of	a	NATO	Membership	Action	Plan	(MAP).	
According	to	NATO,	agreement	on	a	MAP	“does	not	guarantee	membership,	but	is	a	key	preparation	mechanism.”11	
(In	contrast,	NATO’s	Partnership	for	Peace	(PfP)	is	not	designed	as	a	stepping-stone	to	NATO	accession	and	does	not	
strengthen	the	alliance’s	defensive	capabilities,	so	PfP	participation	does	not	indicate	a	membership	prospect.)	As	
shown	below,	the	results	here	are	also	rather	weak:	only	42%	of	the	cases	fit	the	hypothesized	relationship.	
	
Hyp.6b,	test	2:	NATO	membership	or	prospective	membership	–	21/50	or	42%	fit	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Overall,	the	two	geopolitical	explanations	–	conflict	risk	and	alliance	credibility	--	do	not	co-vary	with	EU	
decisions	on	membership	eligibility	in	the	hypothesized	manner.	The	two	tests	of	a	possible	alliance	credibility	
motive	only	fit	that	hypothesis	in	34%	and	42%	of	the	cases,	while	the	two	tests	of	conflict	risk	only	fit	the	
hypothesis	in	19%	and	49%	of	the	cases	compared	to	all	states	depending	on	the	risk	threshold,	and	24%	and	46%	of	
the	cases	compared	just	to	European	states	depending	on	the	risk	threshold.12	Interestingly,	on	conflict	risk,	there	is	
almost	no	difference	between	the	tests	using	global	and	European	benchmarks	but	lowering	the	risk	threshold	from	
50%	to	25%	does	produce	a	major	reduction	in	explanatory	fit	in	both	global	and	European	tests.	In	fact,	the	very	
weak	correlations	(19%	global	and	24%	European)	with	the	lower	risk	threshold	seems	to	indicate	that	the	EU	is	
biased	against	very	low-risk	states	when	deciding	on	membership	eligibility	--	the	opposite	of	the	hypothesis!	It	is	
certainly	plausible	that	the	community	might	try	to	use	accession	as	a	means	to	stabilize	risky	states	in	its	
neighbourhood,	but	this	conclusion	is	belied	by	the	fact	that	all	European	states	during	the	Cold	War	(plus	states	in	
south-eastern	Europe	after	the	Cold	War)	were	exposed	to	a	relatively	high	risk	of	conflict,	so	there	were	almost	no	
very	low-risk	states	seeking	accession.	It	is	nonetheless	apparent	that	aspirant	states	whose	conflict	risk	makes	them	
“the	most	costly	to	integrate”	(Donno	et	al.	2015:	253)	are	frequently	deemed	eligible	for	integration.	In	the	end,	it																																																									
11	http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2016_07/20160627_1607-factsheet-enlargement-eng.pdf,	
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_37356.htm,	http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49212.htm#	
12	To	ensure	that	these	low	correlations	are	not	an	artifact	of	our	25%	threshold	for	very-low	risk,	we	re-analyzed	the	data	with	a	
33%	threshold	and	found	that	this	has	no	major	effect	on	the	explanatory	fit,	which	rises	from	19%	(global	comparison)	and	24%	
(Europe	comparison)	to	just	27%	in	both	comparisons.	
	 	
NATO	member	
	
	
Not	NATO	member	
	
Eligible	
	
	
11/50	=	22%	
	
28/50	=	56%	
	
Not	eligible	
	
	
	
5/50	=	10%	
	
6/50	=	12%	
	 	
Current	or	prospective	NATO	
member	
	
	
Not	current	or	prospective	NATO	
member	
	
	
Eligible	
	
	
15/50	=	30%	
	
24/50	=	48%	
	
Not	eligible	
	
	
	
5/50	=	10%	
	
6/50	=	12%	
appears	that	EC/EU	decision-making	on	membership	eligibility	since	1957	has	not	been	shaped	very	strongly	by	
geopolitical	pressures.	
V. Discussion	of	cross-tabulations	
	
The	preceding	section	of	this	chapter	tested	the	correlation	between	empirical	indicators	of	various	possible	
determinants	of	EU	decisions	on	the	eligibility	of	non-member	states	seeking	accession	and	the	outcomes	observed	
in	all	identifiable	cases	of	such	decisions	since	the	birth	of	the	community	in	1957,	and	compared	these	results	to	a	
baseline	expectation	that	the	EU	would	consider	all	aspirant	states	eligible	for	membership.	As	summarized	in	Table	
2	below,	the	empirical	expectations	associated	with	some	explanations	showed	a	strong	fit	with	the	positive	and	
negative	outcomes	in	the	50	cases	while	others	showed	a	far	weaker	fit.	(As	shown	in	the	far-right	column	of	the	
table,	limiting	the	analysis	to	pre-2006	cases,	when	all	the	hypotheses	can	be	tested	equally,	does	not	significantly	
affect	their	relative	explanatory	power.)	It	is	striking	how	poorly	well-established	theories	of	EU	decision-making	
focused	on	regime	type,	commercial	and	security	interests	seem	to	fit	the	pattern	of	EU	decisions	on	membership	
eligibility.	The	analysis	shows	weak	correlations	for	territorial	contiguity	(57%),	regime	similarity	(43%,	60%),	
commercial	variables	(40%,	60%),	conflict	risk	(49%,	19%,	46%,	24%)	and	alliance	credibility	(34%,	42%),	which	
suggest	that	these	variables	had	little	causal	or	constitutive	effect	across	the	universe	of	cases.	
To	be	clear,	though,	these	findings	relate	only	to	the	pattern	of	decisions	on	membership	eligibility.	The	
weak	impact	of	regime	type,	commercial	and	security	interests	on	eligibility	decisions	reveals	nothing	about	their	
possible	influence	on	subsequent	decision-making	regarding	whether	a	particular	candidate	state	is	ready	for	
accession	or	the	conditions	that	the	community	may	set	for	its	accession:	these	decisions	occur	at	a	different	stage	
in	the	pre-accession	process	and	have	different	consequences,	so	they	could	well	be	shaped	by	different	
considerations.	In	contrast,	the	baseline	expectation,	as	well	as	hypotheses	focused	on	membership	norms,	treaty	
rules,	and	regional	location	all	correlate	with	the	outcomes	in	approximately	70-80%	of	the	cases.	These	strong	
findings	are	suggestive	of	a	significant	causal	or	constitutive	effect	on	EU	decisions,	which	we	discuss	below	in	more	
detail.		
	
Table	2:	Summary	of	cross-tabulation	analysis	
	
Explanation	
	
	
Hypothesis	
	
Test	variable(s)	
	
Fit		
(max.	scope)	
	
	
Fit		
(pre-2006)	
Baseline	 A	regional	community	will	accord	
membership	eligibility	to	all	aspirant	
states.	
N/A	 39/50	=	78%	 34/42	=	81%	
Membership	
norms	
	
A	regional	community	will	accord	
membership	eligibility	to	aspirant	
states	that	fit	the	community’s	
membership	norm,	and	deny	it	to	
others.	
Membership	norms	1957-
1961,	1962-1969,	1970-2005,	
(2006-2015)	
33/42	=	79%	 33/42	=	79%	
Regional	location	
	
A	regional	community	will	accord	
membership	eligibility	to	aspirant	
states	whose	territory	lies	within	the	
geographic	space	conventionally	
identified	with	the	region,	and	deny	
it	to	others.		
‘Europe’	-	Encyclopædia	
Britannica	
	
‘Europe’	-	United	Nations	
39/50	=	78%	
	
	
38/50	=	76%	
34/42	=	81%	
	
	
33/42	=	79%	
	
Territorial	
contiguity	
	
A	regional	community	will	accord	
membership	eligibility	to	aspirant	
states	whose	territory	is	contiguous	
to	that	of	a	current	member	state,	
and	reject	others.	
Territorial	contiguity	 26/50	=	52%	 24/42	=	57%	
Treaty	rules	
	
A	regional	community	will	accord	
membership	eligibility	to	non-
member	states	that	fit	the	
substantive	rule	on	memberships	
established	by	the	community’s	
treaty,	and	reject	others.		
Treaty	rules	1957-1986,	1987-
2015	
	
Treaty	rules	1957-1992,	1993-
2015	
35/50	=	70%	
	
	
34/50	=	68%	
32/42	=	76%	
	
	
33/42	=	79%	
Regime	similarity	
	
A	regional	community	will	accord	
membership	eligibility	to	aspirant	
states	whose	regime	type	is	similar	
to	that	of	the	member	states,	and	
reject	those	that	are	dissimilar.	
V-Dem	‘liberal’	of	aspirant	vs.	
mean	member	state	
	
V-Dem	‘liberal’	of	aspirant	vs.	
least	‘liberal’	member	state	
21/48	=	44%	
	
	
29/48	=	60%	
17/40	=	43%	
	
	
24/40	=	60%	
	
Well-regulated	
markets	
	
A	regional	community	will	accord	
membership	eligibility	to	aspirant	
states	whose	regulatory	capacity	is	
equal	or	superior	to	that	of	member	
states.	
Aspirant’s	GDP	per	capita	>=	
GDP	per	capita	of	the	poorest	
member	state	
20/50	=	40%	 16/42	=	38%	
Non-competitive	
markets	
	
A	regional	community	will	accord	
membership	eligibility	to	aspirant	
states	whose	level	of	economic	
development	is	below	that	of	
member	states.	
Aspirant’s	GDP	per	capita	<	
member	states’	GDP	per	
capita	
30/50	=	60%	 26/42	=	62%	
Conflict	risk	
	
A	regional	community	will	accord	
membership	eligibility	to	aspirant	
states	that	pose	a	low	risk	of	
involvement	in	inter-state	conflict,	
and	deny	it	to	others.	
50%	least	risky,	global	
	
25%	least	risky,	global	
	
50%	least	risky,	Europe	
	
25%	least	risky,	Europe	
18/37	=	49%	
	
7/37	=	19%	
	
17/37	=	46%	
	
9/37	=	24%	
N/A	
Alliance	credibility	
	
A	regional	community	will	accord	
membership	eligibility	to	aspirant	
states	that	belong	to	the	security	
alliance	to	which	its	members	
already	belong,	and	deny	it	to	
others.	
NATO	membership	
	
NATO	membership	or	
prospect	of	membership	
17/50	=	34%	
	
21/50	=	42%	
11/42	=	26%	
	
17/42	=	40%	
	
The	78%	predictive	accuracy	of	the	baseline	‘open	door’	expectation	is	impressive	but	nonetheless	of	limited	
utility.	On	the	one	hand,	it	seems	to	support	the	public	impression,	especially	in	Eurosceptic	circles,	that	the	EU	has	
an	‘open	door’	reflex	in	response	to	non-member	states	seeking	to	join	the	club.	Yet	more	than	one-fifth	of	the	cases	
do	not	fit	the	baseline	expectation,	and	all	EU	observers	know	that	member	states	often	disagree	intensely	on	the	
eligibility	of	particular	applicant	states.	In	recent	years,	these	disputes	over	eligibility	have	repeatedly	spilled	into	
public	view	and	some	have	even	become	the	focus	of	national	elections	and	referenda.	In	addition,	the	50	cases	
studied	here	include	many	situations	where	the	community	reconsidered	an	aspirant	state	whose	eligibility	it	had	
already	decided,	sometimes	more	than	once,	and	there	is	nothing	in	either	of	the	baseline	expectation’s	two	
possible	logics	that	would	explain	such	reconsiderations.	We	thus	have	good	reason	to	doubt	the	explanatory	power	
of	a	prediction	that	the	community	will	welcome	all	applicants,	even	if	it	correlates	highly	with	outcomes.	As	long	as	
there	are	strong	alternatives,	the	presumption	of	a	constant	preference	will	never	be	a	compelling	explanation	for	a	
series	of	hotly	contested	and	highly	variable	decisions.		
The	analysis	also	shows	strong	support	for	geographic	explanations.	The	territorial	contiguity	hypothesis	
clearly	has	very	limited	explanatory	power	(52%	fit),	but	the	two	tests	of	applicant	states’	location	within	‘Europe’	
(78%	and	76%	fit)	suggest	that	conventional	understandings	of	geography	do	matter.	This	is	not	surprising,	given	
that	the	EC	was	created	explicitly	to	ensure	peace	and	freedom	in	Europe	and	the	Treaty	of	Rome	invited	all	
“European	states”	(and	implicitly,	only	them)	to	apply	for	membership.	In	that	context,	the	EC’s	1987	rejection	of	
Morocco’s	quest	for	accession	was	rather	predictable.	That	said,	these	strong	results	are	due	partly	to	the	absence,	
other	than	Morocco,	of	expressions	of	interest	in	accession	from	states	lying	clearly	beyond	the	conventional	
geographic	limits	of	Europe.	
In	any	case,	looking	beyond	the	statistical	tests,	it	is	clear	that	conceiving	of	‘European’	as	a	reference	simply	
to	physical	location	is	seriously	misleading.	For	example,	the	EU	never	questioned	the	eligibility	of	Cyprus,	whose	
territory	is	far	closer	to	Southwest	Asia	than	to	the	bulk	of	Europe,	but	it	did	not	hesitate	in	earlier	decades	to	
declare	Greece	and	Spain	ineligible.	Or,	consider	the	Urals	and	the	Bosporus,	which	are	often	cited	as	the	eastern	
frontiers	of	Europe.	The	size	and	proportion	of	Kazakhstan’s	territory	that	lies	west	of	the	Ural	Mountains	and	Ural	
River	is	far	larger	than	the	size	or	proportion	of	Turkish	territory	that	lies	north	of	the	Bosporus,	yet	Turkey	is	
recognized	as	a	candidate	for	membership	while	Kazakhstan	is	covered	by	the	EU’s	Regional	Strategy	Paper	for	
Central	Asia	and	never	mentioned	as	a	possible	member.		
Conceiving	of	regional	geography	simply	in	terms	of	physical	location	thus	cannot	provide	a	satisfactory	
explanation	of	a	state’s	eligibility	to	join	a	regional	organization.	As	John	Gerard	Ruggie	(1999:235)	recognized,	
“space	is	not	given	in	nature.	It	is	a	social	construct	that	people,	somehow,	invent.”	The	expectation	that	the	EU	
would	consider	all	European	states	eligible	for	membership	thus	has	very	limited	explanatory	power	unless	one	
includes	variables	that	cannot	be	reduced	to	physical	location.	For	example,	when	pressed	five	decades	after	the	
Treaty	of	Rome	to	define	“European,”	the	European	Commission	conceded	that	its	meaning	had	always	been	multi-
dimensional:	“The	term	'European'	combines	geographical,	historical	and	cultural	elements	which	all	contribute	to	
European	identity	...[which]	is	subject	to	review	by	each	succeeding	generation.”13	If	political	actors	in	Europe	hold	
similar	conceptions	of	the	physical	limits	of	their	region	at	particular	moments	in	time,	and	make	membership	
decisions	accordingly,	their	actions	are	being	shaped	by	shared	ideas	and	not	physical	location.	This	is	why	fewer	and	
fewer	scholars	today	treat	regions	“simply	as	abstractions	or	as	a	priori	spatial	givens,	but	instead	as	the	results	of	
social	processes	that	reflect	and	shape	particular	ideas	about	how	the	world	is	or	should	be	organized”	(Murphy	
1991:	24).		
	 This	brings	us	back	to	membership	norms.	The	results	summarized	above	show	striking	support	for	the	
hypothesis	that	EU	decisions	on	membership	eligibility	are	shaped	by	membership	norms	prevailing	amongst	the	
community’s	member	states	and	supranational	institutions.	In	fact,	the	correlation	for	membership	norms	(79%)	is	
significantly	higher	than	that	found	for	other,	more	traditional	explanations	of	EU	decision-making	such	as	
commercial	and	geopolitical	incentives.	On	the	other	hand,	the	membership	norms	argument	is	weakened	by	its	
inability	to	explain	decisions	made	when	the	community’s	member	states	and	supranational	institutions	do	not	
converge	on	a	shared	definition	of	eligibility.	Instead,	the	theory	states	clearly	that	decisions	in	such	situations	will	
be	based	upon	hard	bargaining	among	member	states	whose	final	choices	are	not	determined	by	membership	
norms.	For	example,	EU	member	states	seem	to	agree	in	the	post-2005	period	that	all	states	seeking	membership	
must	be	‘European’	but	they	did	not	agree	on	what	criteria	are	sufficient	for	membership	eligibility.	Given	that	no	
states	located	beyond	the	conventional	geographic	boundaries	of	‘Europe’	sought	EU	membership	after	2005,	
membership	norms	cannot	explain	the	eight	decisions	on	eligibility	that	the	community	nonetheless	made	in	this	
period.	However,	for	the	42	cases	included	in	the	test	of	the	membership	norms	hypothesis,	geographic	location	is	
covered	because	the	community’s	membership	norm	always	required	that	states	seeking	accession	must	be	
‘European’	in	addition	to	other	criteria.	
	 In	sum,	the	cross-tabs	reveal	a	strikingly	high	correlation	between	EU	membership	norms	prevailing	in	
particular	periods	and	the	EU’s	decisions	on	the	membership	eligibility	of	aspirant	states.	The	fact	that	this	
correlation	is	far	stronger	for	membership	norms	than	for	many	other,	more	conventional	explanations	of	EU	
decision-making,	and	is	not	exceeded	by	any	competing	explanation,	provides	strong	support	for	the	argument	that	
the	EU’s	decisions	on	its	geographic	limits	as	a	political	community	cannot	be	understood	without	serious	attention	
to	the	role	of	membership	norms.	
	
VI. Robustness	checks	
																																																									
13	Andrew	Rettman,	“Israel	takes	bashing	in	EU	foreign	relations	audit,”	23.04.2009,	www.euobserver.com/24/27994/	
The	aforementioned	conclusion	regarding	the	explanatory	power	of	membership	norms	is	also	supported	by	two	
additional	robustness	checks	using	distinct	empirical	methods.	As	summarised	below,	analysis	using	logistic	
regression	shows	that	our	findings	hold	even	when	we	control	for	the	impact	of	the	other	potential	explanatory	
factors.	A	final	check	using	crisp	set	Qualitative	Comparative	Analysis	(csQCA)	yields	similar	conclusions	with	regard	
to	the	importance	of	membership	norms	even	if	we	adopt	a	conjunctural	(rather	than	correlational)	logic	of	
causation	open	to	the	possibility	of	independent	multivariate	causal	pathways	to	the	same	outcome.	The	fact	that	
both	of	these	checks	confirmed	the	importance	of	norms	for	explaining	decisions	on	EU	membership	eligibility	
makes	us	confident	with	regard	to	the	internal	validity	of	the	claims	we	have	made.	
	
Logistic	regression	analysis	
	
As	a	first	check	on	our	findings	from	the	cross-tab	analysis,	we	ran	a	range	of	logistic	regression	models	predicting	EU	
membership	eligibility.	We	did	so	despite	two	reasons	for	being	skeptical	about	the	utility	of	this	method:	first,	the	
number	of	observations	(50)	is	lower	than	normally	recommended	for	statistical	regression;	and	second,	the	
assumption	of	independent	observations	is	violated	within	our	data	–	some	countries	appear	multiple	times	and	the	
individual	outcomes	on	these	cases	are	probably	related	to	one	another,	while	decisions	on	some	countries	might	
well	have	been	influenced	by	other	cases.	However,	since	the	50	decisions	on	EU	eligibility	in	our	dataset	constitute	
the	whole	population	of	cases,	and	the	clustering	of	observations	is	limited	(i.e.	most	countries	appear	only	once),	
we	concluded	that	checking	our	previous	findings	by	means	of	logistic	regression	analysis	is	an	appropriate	way	to	
increase	the	confidence	in	our	earlier	conclusions.	
To	that	end,	Table	X	reports	a	range	of	multivariate	logistic	regression	models.	All	models	were	estimated	
using	R.	To	make	use	of	the	full	amount	of	empirical	information,	the	regime	type,	economic,	and	risk	variables	are	
continuous	measures	of	the	underlying	theoretical	concepts,	rather	than	the	binary	variables	we	used	earlier.	For	
example,	the	regime	type	variable	now	displays	the	difference	between	a	country’s	V-Dem	liberal	democracy	score	
and	the	respective	minimum	within	the	EU,	etc.	The	models	confirm	our	earlier	findings:	membership	norms	turn	
out	to	be	meaningful	predictors	of	EU	membership	eligibility.	Even	when	controlling	for	other	factors,	applicants	that	
meet	the	normative	requirements	held	by	the	EU	member	states	have	a	higher	likelihood	of	being	granted	
membership	eligibility.	
	
Table	X.	Predicting	EU	membership	eligibility	
	 Dependent	variable:	
	 	
	 EU	eligibility	(1	=	eligible)	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	
	
Membership	norms	 3.734**	 3.315**	 	 	 	
(1=	norms	are	met)	 (1.860)	 (1.301)	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Regional	location		 1.602	 1.365	 .321	 .810	 1.002	
(1=	within	Europe	according	to	Encyclopedia	Britannica)	 (2.053)	 (1.949)	 (1.869)	 (1.782)	 (1.707)	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Treaty	rules	 	 	 .976	 1.296	 	
(1=	treaty	rules	with	change	in	1986	are	met)	 	 	 (1.274)	 (1.256)	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Regime	similarity	 -1.253	 	 3.412	 	 3.625	
(difference	to	minimum	V-Dem	score	in	EU	in	given	year)	 (3.685)	 	 (2.559)	 	 (2.483)	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Market	regulation	 -.0001	 -.0001	 -.0001	 -.00005	-.00004	
(difference	to	gdp	p.c.	of	least	developed	member	state)	 (.0001)	 (.0001)	 (.0001)	 (.0001)	 (.0001)	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Conflict	risk	 -6.354	 -5.078	 -2.645	 -7.702	 -2.195	
(based	on	Nordhaus,	Oneal	and	Russett	2012)	 (7.494)	 (6.493)	 (6.890)	 (5.576)	 (6.923)	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Intercept	 -1.037	 -.732	 1.473	 1.585	 1.487	
	 (2.633)	 (2.437)	 (1.921)	 (1.845)	 (1.953)	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	
Observations	 37	 37	 37	 37	 37	
Log	Likelihood	 -12.034	-12.094	-14.782	-15.786	-15.075	
AIC	 36.069	 34.187	 41.565	 41.572	 40.150	
	
Note:	*p<0.1;	**p<0.05;	***p<0.01.	Entries	are	logit	coefficients;	standard	errors	in	parentheses.	
						
Both	models	1	and	2	estimate	a	significant	effect	of	the	membership	norms	variable,	while	no	other	coefficient	
reaches	acceptable	levels	of	significance	in	any	of	the	models.14	Since	membership	norms	are	highly	correlated	with	
the	regime	type	and	the	treaty	variable,	and	the	latter	includes	itself	a	measure	of	norms,	we	estimate	models	
containing	all	possible	combinations	of	these	three	factors.	This	exercise	adds	further	support	to	the	conclusion	that	
membership	norms	matter.		
	
	
Crisp	set	qualitative	comparative	analysis	(csQCA)		
	
Qualitative	Comparative	Analysis	(QCA)	is	a	valuable	as	a	way	to	check	for	causal	patterns	that	could	be	missed	by	
cross-tab	correlations	or	logistic	regression	analysis.	Its	promise	lies	in	its	fit	with	a	conjunctural	understanding	of	
causation,	whereby	multiple	configurations	of	variables	(‘conditions’	in	QCA	parlance)	may	lead	to	a	given	outcome	
(for	a	good	introduction	to	QCA,	see	Schneider	&	Wagemann	2012).	We	have	not	previously	formulated	our	
theoretical	expectations	in	terms	of	causal	heterogeneity	and	we	do	not	to	do	so	here.	However,	we	have	
recognised	multiple	plausible	explanations	of	membership	eligibility	and	we	can	imagine	a	number	of	plausible	
configurations	leading	to	membership	(in)eligibility.	Moreover,	our	dataset	is	very	well	suited	to	the	requirements	of	
csQCA:	it	includes	a	rather	small	number	of	observations	(n=50),	the	independent	and	dependent	variables	are	
dichotomized,	and	each	observation	is	placed	in	a	mutually	exclusive	subset	of	cases.	For	instance,	cases	belong	
either	to	the	group	of	countries	that	were	deemed	eligible	or	to	the	group	of	those	that	were	not;	they	either	lie	
within	Europe	or	not,	have	a	competitive	market	or	not,	and	are	at	a	high	risk	of	interstate	conflict	or	not.	This	
permits	us	to	use	QCA	inductively	to	re-check	the	robustness	of	our	initial	finding	that	EU	membership	norms	play	an	
important	role	in	the	community’s	decision-making.	
To	do	so,	we	start	by	excluding	all	post-2005	cases	from	the	dataset,	as	we	have	missing	information	for	a	
range	of	variables	for	these	cases.	To	capture	the	conditions	that	potentially	form	part	of	the	path	leading	to	
membership	eligibility,	we	include	one	factor	for	each	of	the	theoretical	arguments	developed	above.	When	multiple	
operationalizations	are	available	for	the	same	test,	we	used	the	one	with	the	greatest	explanatory	power	in	the	main	
analysis.	We	then	constructed	a	truth	table	that	displays	the	configurations	of	conditions	and	outcomes	as	observed	
in	our	data	(Table	Y).	For	this,	we	removed	all	rows	of	configurations	of	conditions	and	outcomes	that	were	not	
empirically	observed	at	least	once.	In	addition,	as	we	have	a	large	number	of	observations	(by	QCA	standards),	quite	
precise	and	strong	theoretical	expectations,	and	a	high	confidence	in	our	coding	of	the	data,	we	set	0.8	as	the	
																																																								
14	The	effects	of	membership	norms	remain	significant	at	the	same	level	of	confidence	when	we	calculate	robust	standard	errors	
instead	of	normal	ones.		
consistency	cut-off	value.	This	means	that	rows	in	our	truth	table	for	which	at	least	80%	of	the	cases	contained	
exhibit	the	expected	outcome	are	identified	as	sufficient	configurations	for	membership	eligibility.15		
	
Table	Y.	QCA	truth	table	
EU	
eligible	
Membership	
norms	
Part	of	
Europe	
(Encyclopedia	
Britannica	
definition)	
Fit	with	
treaty	
rules	
(1986	
change)	
Regime	
similarity	
(comparison	
to	least	
democratic	
member	
state)	
Well-
regulated	
market	
(GDP	p.c.	
is	higher	
than	min.	
in	EU	in	
given	
year)	
Country	
is	
among	
the	
bottom	
half	of	
global	
risk	
ranking	
Number	of	
cases	per	
configuration	
Consistency	
(proportion	
of	cases	
exhibiting	
the	
outcome)	
1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 0	 1	 6	 1	
1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 0	 0	 4	 1	
1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 0	 2	 1	
1	 0	 1	 1	 1	 0	 0	 1	 1	
1	 1	 1	 1	 0	 1	 0	 1	 1	
1	 0	 1	 1	 1	 1	 0	 1	 1	
1	 1	 1	 1	 0	 0	 1	 1	 1	
1	 1	 0	 0	 0	 1	 1	 1	 1	
1	 1	 1	 1	 0	 0	 0	 8	 0.875	
0	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 8	 0.75	
0	 0	 1	 0	 0	 0	 0	 11	 0.727273	
0	 0	 1	 0	 0	 1	 0	 2	 0.5	
0	 0	 1	 1	 0	 0	 0	 2	 0	
0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 1	 0	
0	 0	 1	 0	 0	 0	 1	 1	 0	
	
Logical	minimization	identifies	four	parsimonious	configurations	of	conditions	that	lead	to	EU	eligibility	
(Table	Z).	The	consistency	of	each	of	the	four	configurations,	just	as	that	of	the	solution	as	a	whole,	are	high,	
meaning	that	almost	all	cases	sharing	a	particular	configuration	of	conditions	also	share	the	same	outcome.	
Most	noteworthy,	membership	norms	feature	in	three	of	the	four	identified	configurations:	meeting	the	
membership	norms	and	not	being	among	the	bottom	half	of	the	global	risk	ranking,	meeting	the	norms	and	not	
having	a	well-regulated	market,	or	meeting	the	norms	but	not	having	a	sufficiently	similar	regime	type	all	lead	to	EU	
membership	eligibility.	On	the	other	hand,	being	geographically	located	on	the	European	continent	(according	to	
Encyclopedia	Britannica)	but	not	meeting	the	formal	treaty	requirements	and	not	being	among	the	bottom	half	of	
the	global	risk	ranking	is	also	a	configuration	that	leads	to	EU	membership	eligibility.	These	QCA	results	support	our	
previous	conclusion	that	membership	norms	need	to	be	taken	seriously	in	explanations	of	EU	membership	eligibility.	
	
Table	Z.	Analysis	of	causal	configurations	leading	to	EU	membership	eligibility	
Configuration	 Country	meets	
membership	
norms	AND	
country	is	not	
among	the	
bottom	half	of	
global	risk	
ranking	
Country	meets	
membership	
norms	AND	
Country	does	
not	have	a	
well-regulated	
market	
Country	meets	
membership	
norms	AND	does	
not	have	a	
sufficiently	similar	
regime	
Country	is	in	Europe	AND	
does	not	meet	the	treaty	
rules	AND	is	not	among	the	
bottom	half	of	global	risk	
ranking	
																																																								
15	If	we	use	.75	as	a	cut-off	value	instead,	slightly	different	configurations	appear	to	be	important,	but	membership	norms	
continue	to	be	a	relevant	condition	for	membership	eligibility. 
Raw	
Coverage	
	0.411765	 	0.529412	 	0.264706	 	0.176471	
Unique	
Coverage		
	0.0588235	 	0.176471	 	0.0294118	 	0.176471	
Consistency	 	0.933333	 	0.947368	 	0.9	 	0.857143	
Cases	
covered	by	
solution	
Greece	1959,	
Turkey	1959,	
Spain	1960,	
Denmark	
1961,	Greece	
1976,	Spain	
1977,	
Czechoslovakia	
1990,	Bulgaria	
1991,	Estonia	
1994,	Latvia	
1994,	
Lithuania	
1994,	Malta	
1995,	Croatia	
2000,	Serbia	
and	
Montenegro	
2005,	Ukraine	
2005		
Greece	1959,	
Turkey	1959,	
Spain	1960,	
Ireland	1962,	
Portugal	1978,	
Czechoslovakia	
1990,	Hungary	
1990,	Poland	
1990,	Bulgaria	
1991,	Czech	
Republic	1993,	
Estonia	1994,	
Latvia	1994,	
Lithuania	
1994,	Malta	
1995,	Slovenia	
1995,	Slovak	
Republic	1999,	
Croatia	2000,	
Serbia	and	
Montenegro	
2005,	Ukraine	
2005		
Greece	1959,	
Turkey	1959,	Spain	
1960,	Spain	1977,	
Bulgaria	1991,	
Cyprus	1993,	
Slovak	Republic	
1999,	Croatia	2000,	
Serbia	and	
Montenegro	2005,	
Ukraine	2005		
Turkey	1989,		
Romania	1992,	Slovak	
Republic	1993,	Turkey	1999,	
Macedonia	FYR	2000,	
Albania	2003,	Bosnia	and	
Herzegovina	2005	
Solution	Consistency:	.933	
Solution	Coverage:	.824	
Uncovered	cases:	UK	1961,	1963,	1970,	NOR	1962,	ESP	1962,	GRE	1967,	MOR	1987,	AUT	1992,	FIN	
1992,	SWE	1992,	SVK	1997,	TRK	1999	
Cases	in	bold	are	inconsistent:	they	exhibit	the	configuration	of	conditions	but	do	not	share	the	
expected	outcome.		
	
	
VII. Conclusions	
	
This	chapter	has	used	three	distinct	empirical	methods	–	cross-tab	correlations,	logistic	regression	analysis,	and	
qualitative	comparative	analysis	–	to	assess	the	impact	of	EU	membership	norms	on	the	community’s	decisions	
regarding	the	eligibility	of	states	seeking	membership.	All	three	methods	support	the	same	conclusion:	membership	
norms	are	a	powerful	(though	not	all-determining)	factor	in	EU	decision-making.	This	finding	is	particularly	notable	
given	the	widespread	tendency	to	assume	that	EU	decision-making	is	dominated	by	economic	and/or	security	
concerns,	the	novelty	of	the	membership	norms	argument,	and	the	effort	made	here	to	distinguish	these	norms	
conceptually	and	empirically	from	treaty	rules	and	various	indicators	of	state	interests.	Moving	beyond	statistics,	the	
following	three	chapters	provide	rich	evidence	of	membership	norm	dynamics	from	detailed	process	tracing	of	
EC/EU	decision-making	on	the	eligibility	of	Greece	(1959,	1967,	1976),	Spain	(1960,	1962,	1977),	and	(Turkey	(1959,	
1989,	1999,	2007,	2013).	
	
	 	
Appendix:	Imputing	missing	Freedom	House	data	from	V-Dem	data	
	
For	our	test	of	the	membership	norms	argument	we	used	Freedom	House’s	(FH)	‘electoral	democracy’	and	
‘freedom’	scores,	as	they	provide	a	clear	criterion	for	assessing	a	country’s	fit	with	the	membership	norm	prevalent	
at	the	time	of	decision-making.	However,	since	FH	does	not	include	all	our	cases	due	to	limited	temporal	coverage,	
we	decided	to	impute	missing	scores	based	on	V-Dem	data.	In	this	section	we	briefly	describe	the	analytical	steps	we	
took	in	order	to	accomplish	this	task.		
First	of	all,	it	is	noteworthy	that	V-Dem	data	is	highly	predictive	of	FH’s	‘electoral	democracy’	indicator.	As	
shown	below	in	Figure	2a,	FH	electoral	democracies	form	clusters	of	high-scoring	countries	on	both	relevant	V-Dem	
variables	(‘liberal	democracy’	and	‘polyarchy’)	and	have	significantly	higher	mean	scores	as	compared	to	countries	
without	electoral	democratic	institutions	and	practices	(t=-75.8,	p<.01	for	the	V-Dem	polyarchy	Index;	t=-77.3,	p<.01	
for	the	V-Dem	Liberal	Democracy	index).		
	
Figure	1:	Comparison	of	Freedom	House	and	V-Dem	country-year	scores	
	
The	correlations	related	to	liberal	democracy	are	similarly	high.	Teorell	and	colleagues	(2016,	29)	have	shown	that	V-
Dem’s	‘Polyarchy’	index	is	highly	correlated	with	FH’s	‘civil	liberties’	and	‘political	rights’	scores,	and	as	shown	below	
in	Figure	2b,	we	find	strikingly	similar	patterns	with	regard	to	the	relationship	between	V-Dem’s	‘liberal	democracy’	
index	and	FH	scores.		
	
Figure	2:	Correlations	between	country-year	scores	in	Freedom	House	and	V-Dem	datasets	
	
	
With	this	in	mind,	we	use	simple	(logistic)	regression	models	to	predict	a	country’s	FH	scores	based	on	all	
country-year	observations	available	in	both	FH	and	V-Dem.	Employing	V-Dem’s	‘polyarchy’	and	‘liberal	democracy’	
indices	as	dependent	variables,	as	well	as	including	country	dummies	(fixed	effects),	we	predict	a	country’s	freedom	
rating,	i.e.	its	mean	value	on	civil	liberties	and	political	rights	in	a	given	year,	using	OLS.	Countries	are	coded	as	liberal	
democracies	when	their	predicted	value	is	no	higher	than	2.5.	For	a	country’s	classification	as	electoral	democracy,	
we	estimate	a	logistic	regression	model	including	the	same	predictor	variables,	and	count	countries	as	electoral	
democracies	when	their	predicted	probability	to	belong	to	this	category	was	higher	than	0.5.	The	predicted	scores	
were	calculated	as	follows:	
	𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑜𝑚 =∝ +𝑉𝐷𝑒𝑚 𝐿𝑖𝑏.𝐷𝑒𝑚.∗ 𝛽! + 𝑉𝐷𝑒𝑚 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑦𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑦 ∗ 𝛽2 +  𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡; 
 
and   𝑃(𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 = 1) = !∝!!"#$ !"#.!"#.∗!!!!"#$ !"#$%&'!!∗!!! !"#$%&' !"#$% !""!#$!!!∝!!"#$ !"#.!"#.∗!!!!"#$ !"#$%&'!!∗!!! !"#$%&' !"#$% !""!#$ ;  
where α and β stand for the estimated coefficients. 
	
Both	models	fit	the	data	reasonably	well	with	94%	of	variance	being	explained	by	the	OLS	model,	and	90%	of	correct	
classifications	and	a	reduction	of	prediction	error	by	74%	by	the	logistic	regression	model.	Nonetheless,	in	order	to	
increase	our	confidence	in	the	predicted	scores	we	ran	a	number	of	robustness	checks,	including	slightly	different	
model	specifications,	comparable	models	based	on	Polity	IV	data,	models	including	Polity	IV	and	V-Dem	predictors,	
and	models	for	European	countries	only.	All	these	robustness	checks	provided	substantially	similar	results.	In	sum,	
the	advantage	of	having	a	clear	and	discriminating	classification	scheme	for	different	regime	types,	as	provided	by	
FH	data,	far	outweighs	the	minor	uncertainty	introduced	by	this	imputation	procedure.	
Using	the	estimated	regression	equations,	we	imputed	the	following	scores	for	regime	characteristics	in	
country-years	not	included	in	the	FH	dataset	(Table	Y):	
	
Table	Y:	Imputed	regime	scores	for	country-years	not	covered	by	Freedom	House	data	
Country	(Year)	 Parliamentary	Democracy	
(1=yes;	0=no)	
Liberal	Democracy	(scores	1-7,	
with	1.0	–	2.5	signifying	liberal	
democracy)	
Ireland	(1962)	 1	 Not	relevant	for	eligibility	
Norway	(1962)	 1	
Spain	(1962)	 0	
United	Kingdom	(1963)	 1	
Greece	(1967)	 0	
United	Kingdom	(1967)	 1	
United	Kingdom	(1970)	 1	 1.5	
Serbia	and	Montenegro	(2006)	 	 2	
Kosovo	(2013)	 1	 4	
	
	
	
	
